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Abstract
This study examines the role of CEOs’ pensions and deferred 
compensations by exploring their impacts on pricing and non-pricing 
contract terms of bank loans. CEO’s inside debt, defined as the sum of 
defined benefit pensions and deferred compensations, pays fixed amounts 
at periodic intervals. We find that higher inside debt holdings significantly 
reduce both loan rate spreads and demands for collateral. We also find that 
such effects are particularly pronounced under weak external governance 
proxied by strong anti-takeover defenses. Overall, our results support the 
idea that debt-like incentives for CEOs increase align the interests between 
managers and creditors.
Keywords: inside debt, managerial agency, costs of debt, debt contracts, 
loan terms
INTRODUCTION
“Why are managers’ monetary incentives … traditionally correlated 
with the value of equity rather than the value of debt?” (Dewatripont 
and Tirole 1994)
“There is another type of distortion that should be recognized: 
payoffs to financial executives have been shielded from the 
consequences that losses could impose on parties other than 
shareholders” (Bebchuk 2010)
A vast prior literature in corporate finance assumes that 
managerial incentives are composed of cash and stock-based 
*   Assistant professor, KDI School of Public Policy and Management, Republic of 
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compensation and align the interests of shareholders and 
management. A recent research by Sundaram and Yermack 
(2007), however, shows that CEOs in the U.S. do have debt-based 
incentives. CEO’s inside debt, defined as the sum of defined benefit 
pensions and differed compensations, is 9 percent of the sum of his/
her inside debt and equity linked wealth in 2006 and has sharply 
increased to 15 percent in 2009 (See figure 1 for details). CEO’s 
inside debt pays fixed amounts for lifelong or given periods, and 
the amount of payments does not vary explicitly with stock price. 
CEO’s inside debt, however, is largely underfunded and unsecured, 
suggesting that the present value of such incentives is tightly linked 
with default risk. Despite the significant presence of inside debt, our 
understanding of debt-like CEO incentives is at best limited.
This paper attempts to shed light on the role of CEO’s inside debt 
by investigating its impact on pricing and non-pricing contract 
terms using detailed information on loans to publicly traded large 
corporations in the U.S. during 2006-2009. Agency and signaling 
views predict that closely aligned interests between borrowers and 
creditors reduce costs of debt, but they make distinct predictions for 
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Figure 1. Trends in CEO Inside Debt Holdings
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Smith and Warner (1979) posit that better alignment of the interests 
leads to lower rate and less tight covenants (and less demand for 
collateral). Conversely, Besanko and Thakor (1987) predict that 
“good” borrowers likely to choose lower rate but tighter covenants 
(including more demand for collateral) in order to sort themselves 
out. These predictions highlight the importance of testing the joint 
hypotheses on loan pricing and non-price contract terms together. 
In this paper we test the effects of CEO’s inside debt holdings on 
pricing and non-pricing contract terms of bank loans jointly.
We establish novel evidence that the use of inside debt better 
aligns interests of creditors and managers. We find that, on average, 
higher inside-debt holdings decrease loan spreads and lower 
the requirements of collateral, while we cannot find statistically 
significant evidence that inside debt holdings affect debt covenant 
intensity. We also explore the interaction between inside debt 
and external governance and show that these patterns are more 
pronounced for firms with less shareholder-friendly governance. We 
check the robustness of our findings by considering endogenous 
nature of CEO’s inside debt holdings. Our findings remain intact. 
Our analysis contributes to growing empirical research on 
managerial incentives and debt contracting. Wei and Yermack 
(2011) document that CEO’s inside debt holdings reduce the costs 
of publicly traded bonds while increasing costs of equity. Despite 
the evidence for the impacts on publicly traded securities, empirical 
evidence on private debt pricing and non-pricing terms is scant. We 
fill the gap by conducting a comprehensive analysis using detailed 
information on bank loan contracts. 
This study bridges recent studies in corporate governance 
literature by examining the interactive effects of external and 
internal governance; in particular, the interaction between the 
absence of shareholder-friendly corporate governance, proxied by 
strong anti-takeover defenses, and CEO’s inside debt holdings. 
Chava et al. (2009) investigates the impact of anti-takeover defenses 
on costs of debt, implicitly assuming that managerial incentives 
under less shareholder-friendly governance are inevitably aligned 
with creditors’ interests. Meanwhile, Chava et al. (2010) examines 
the average effect of CEO entrenchment on debt covenants, 
indicating that managerial incentives can alter the link between 
interests of managers and creditors. Although these studies examine 
the effects of external and internal governance separately, they do 
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not investigate their interactions. In a realistic setting, there will 
be three-way interactions between shareholders, creditors, and 
managers, suggesting that internal governance, such as managerial 
incentives, may substitute or complement external governance. 
In order to fill the gap, we explore whether inside debt incentives 
complement strong shareholder-friendly governance or whether 
such incentives better align interests of CEOs with those of creditors 
under the lack of shareholder-friendly governance.
A handful of unpublished research also examines the impact 
of CEO inside debt on costs of bank loans (For example, 
Anantharaman et al. 2010, Chen et al. 2010). Our study differs from 
extant studies in a number of ways. Firstly, as we discuss earlier, 
we address the importance of testing the joint hypotheses about 
pricing and non-pricing terms in understanding the role of inside 
debt. 
Secondly, we document new evidence that collateral requirements 
also hinge on CEO’s inside debt holdings; the use of inside debt 
is negatively associated with demand for collateral. Notably, our 
finding does not negate Winton and Rajan (1995)’s assertion that 
good borrowers choose debt contracts with low interest rates and 
high collateral requirements in order to sort themselves out. Instead, 
our findings may indicate that the effects of incentive convergence 
dominate the effect of signaling.
Lastly, we explore the interaction between internal governance 
(managerial incentives) and external governance (discipline by 
takeovers). To my knowledge, this is the first research which 
addresses the importance of the interaction between debt-like CEO 
incentives and vulnerability to hostile takeovers. We show that 
inside debt holdings align creditor and manager interests especially 
when managers have weak incentives to act in the interests of 
shareholders (under strong anti-takeover defenses). This finding 
suggests that, without adequate managerial incentives, managers 
under weak governance may pursue their own interests at the costs 
of both shareholders and creditors.
RELATED LITERATURE AND TESTING HYPOTHESES
A number of recent research studies show that managerial agency 
problems are more intricate than assumed in extant research 
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(Cho 2009; Choi et al. 2007, 2008; Shin 2011). Recent research 
also shows that management can indeed act in the interests of 
bond holders depending on managerial power or incentives. For 
instance, Chava et al. (2010) show that entrenched CEOs tend to 
reduce the use of tight bond covenants. Moreover, Sundaram and 
Yermack (2007) show that the amount of CEO pension is negatively 
associated with risk exposure of the firm. These findings suggest 
that creditor-friendly managerial incentives may mitigate agency 
problems between creditors and management, although such 
incentives can intensify the conflicts between shareholders and 
management. 
There are several different ways in which inside debt can affect 
debt contracting. First of all, CEOs’ inside debt can increase the 
convergence of interests between shareholders and CEOs, thus 
lowering the costs of bank loans and thereby leading to less strict 
debt. In many cases, defined benefit pension are not fully secured. 
This occurs because the pension payments to CEOs are far greater 
than the maximum amount federally secured under ordinary tax-
qualified pension plans (Sundaram and Yermack 2007). In the 
event of a firm’s bankruptcy, the recovery value of pension depends 
on liquidation value of the firm. As a consequence, CEOs with 
significant amounts of pensions and deferred compensations are 
likely to reduce risk exposure, even though such action is against 
shareholders’ interests. If inside debt moderates managers’ risk-
taking incentives, creditors may offer loans with better conditions 
to such firms, including narrowed spreads and low demands for 
collateral and covenants. 
H1: Higher CEO inside debt-holdings reduce costs of bank 
loans and demands for tight covenants and collateral.
Alternatively, CEOs with inside debt compensations may choose 
loans with tight debt covenants and collateral requirements in 
order to lower costs of debt. Besanko and Thakor (1987) posit that 
borrowers with low risk will choose loan contracts with low interest 
rate and collateral requirement in order to separate themselves from 
higher risk borrowers. Garleanu and Zwiebel (2009) also claim that 
“good” borrowers are more likely to accept loans with tighter loan 
covenants when it is possible to renegotiate the tight loan covenants 
ex post. In a similar vein, we conjecture that inside debt may align 
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interests between creditors and management, and that managers 
with inside debt incentives select loan contracts with high demands 
for collateral and tight covenants in order to signal their incentive 
alignments with creditors. We call this as signaling hypothesis.
H2: Managers with higher inside debt holdings choose loans 
with lower spreads but tighter covenants and higher collateral 
requirements.
Smith and Warner (1979) suggest two competing hypotheses: “The 
irrelevance hypothesis” and “the costly contracting hypothesis.” 
According to the irrelevance hypothesis, the firm’s investment 
decisions depend solely on the net present value of projects, 
implying that existence of any type of debt covenant or collateral 
requirement is also irrelevant (Modigliani and Miller 1958). 
H3: Inside debt holdings do not affect private debt contracting.
The costly contracting hypothesis predicts that debt covenants 
can be used to mitigate conflicts of interests between shareholders 
and debt holders, particularly when the costs of covenants are lower 
than the costs of alternative mechanisms to resolve such conflicts. 
Although Smith and Warner (1979) simplifiy intricate managerial 
agency issues in their hypotheses, it is natural to expect that the 
use of CEO’s inside debt can attenuate manager-creditor conflicts 
and substitute the role of debt covenants. As a consequence, inside 
debt may also reduce collateral and covenanant requirements. The 
costly contracting hypothesis also makes the same prediction as 
hypothesis 1.
A strand of recent studies shows that strong shareholder rights 
are beneficial to shareholders but acts against creditors. Gompers 
et al. (2003) introduce a measure of shareholder controls. They 
consider the reciprocal of the number of anti-takeover provisions as 
the proxy for shareholder-friendly corporate governance. They show 
that the stock price of the firms with stronger governance likely to 
be higher. Chava et al. (2009) show that the costs of public debt 
are higher for such firms, supporting the notion that shareholder-
friendly governance exacerbates shareholder-creditor conflicts. 
This literature, however, raises another important question of the 
conditions under which weak shareholder controls can ensure 
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managers to act in the best interests of creditors. Unlike the implicit 
assumption that anti-takeover defenses mechanically help creditors, 
opportunistic managers may pursue their own interests at the costs 
of creditors. Therefore, for a given level of anti-takeover defenses, 
the presence of creditor-friendly incentives, particularly inside debt, 
may affect debt contracts differently.
To extend our understanding of the interaction between 
shareholder rights and creditor friendly incentives, we explore two 
competing possibilities. First of all, if incentives from holding inside 
debt complement the role of strong shareholder rights, we expect 
that the firms with stronger covenant are more likely to use inside 
debt as managerial incentive, and such use of inside debt can lower 
the costs of debt. Conversely, if the potential costs of takeovers 
to creditors are substantial, there will be no or minimal effects 
of inside debt under strong shareholder controls. We expect that 
inside debt can play a significant role only when there is absence of 
shareholder-friendly governance.
DATA AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS
Sample Selection
We obtain detailed information about the terms of syndicated 
and single-lender loans to non-financial and non-utility borrowers 
from Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC)’s DealScan database. DealScan 
database includes loans to large firms and most observations are 
obtained from SEC filings, while the rest of the observations are 
collected through direct contacts with lenders and borrowers (Nini 
et al. 2009). We match the sample with information on CEO equity, 
pensions, and deferred compensation from ExecuComp and firm 
characteristics from COMPUSTAT industrial annual files during the 
years of 2006-2009. In 2006, SEC proposed a rule that would make 
detailed proxy disclosure of executive compensation mandatory. 
We exploit this newly available information on the present 
values of executive stock holdings, pensions, and other deferred 
compensations. When we merge COMPUSTAT and ExecuComp 
with the loan observations, we use the link between COMPUSTAT 
and Dealscan database, provided by Chava and Roberts (2008).1) 
  1) We thank Michael Robert for generously providing the link file to us.
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Importantly, we use the most recent accounting information that is 
available before loans are made to borrowers in order to avoid the 
problem of reverse causality. 
Dealscan database includes tranche-level observations. When a 
loan deal consists of multiple tranches (named as “facility” in the 
data), each tranche has a different rate of interest but the same loan 
covenants as the other tranches in the same deal. Following Sufi 
(2007), we use deal-level data.2) We use tranche amount-weighted 
means of spreads above LIBOR. 
When we examine the interactive effects of anti-takeover defenses 
and inside debt on loan contract terms, we match the data with 
G-index which is defined as the number of anti-hostile takeover 
provisions (see Gompers et al. 2003 for details).3)
Empirical Specifications
This paper investigates the impact of CEO inside debt on loan 
pricing and non-pricing contract terms. To do so, we estimate the 
following regressions.
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  2) Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong (2010) and Chen, Dou, and Wang (2011) report 
that their numbers of observations are larger than ours. This happens due to 
two following reasons. First, they use tranche-level data. Since tranches are part 
of a deal, their interest rates can be highly clustered. Covenants are in fact the 
same for all the tranches in a deal. To avoid the potential bias due to clustering, 
we follow Sufi(2007) and use deal-level data. Secondly, their papers do not seem 
to merge past account information with loans. This can cause serious reverse 
causality problems. Although we do not report the results here, we re-examined 
our results using loan-level data merged in fiscal years although some account-
ing information become available after loans are initiated. We also find that the 
results for debt covenants become significant, findings similar to Anantharaman, 
Divya, Vivian W. Fang, and Guojin Gong (2010). We claim that such results are 
potentially subject to serious reverse causality problems.
3)  We are grateful to Andrew Metrick for generously sharing the data with us.
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and 
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where Loan spread is spread over LIBOR which includes all relevant 
fees and spread over LIBOR (“All-in-drawn Spread”). Collateral 
required is a dummy variable that equals one if a loan is secured by 
collateral and zero otherwise. Covenant intensity is defined as the 
number of various types of bank loan covenants following Graham 
et al. (2008) and Bradley and Roberts (2004). Similar to these 
studies, we also consider two distinct types of covenants, specifically 
financial covenants and general covenants.
The measure of CEO inside debt is the sum of the balance of 
deferred compensations and the value of defined benefit pensions. 
We scale it with the sum of inside debt and shareholdings since 
the incentive effects of inside debt are likely to hinge on the relative 
portion of inside debt. For instance, when CEO’s shareholdings are 
substantially large, the impact of inside debt may become minimal. 
This also makes the inside debt ratio approach to zero. Meanwhile, 
Sundaram and Yermack (2007) use a definition of inside debt ratio 
different from ours. They define inside debt ratio as inside debt 
over shareholdings, but we do not use their definition because a 
signficant number of CEOs in our data hold no or small amount of 
equity or stock options. If a CEO does not hold any equity, of course, 
Sundaram and Yermack (2007)’s ratio cannot be defined, while our 
definition does not suffer from such problem.
The control variables attempt to reflect various characteristics 
known to affect private or public debt contract terms. Controls 
include firm characteristics, loan type dummies, loan purpose 
dummies. Firm -level controls include firm size (log of book value 
of total assets), return on assets (EBITDA divided by total assets), 
leverage (total liabilities divided by total assets), growth opportunities 
as measured by market-to-book ratio (market value of equity 
plus the book value of liabilities over total assets), credit quality 
approximated by Altman’s Z-core, a dummy variable of having credit 
rating and another dummy variable for investment grade credit 
rating (see Han (2008b)).
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Controls also include asset tangibility proxied by property, 
plant, and equipment (PPE) divided by total assets. According to 
Benmelech et al. (2005), Almeida and Campello (2007) and Han 
(2008a), redeployability of tangible assets significantly influences 
firms’ financial constraints, yielding better terms of credit. CEOs 
in firms with highly liquid assets may more easily engage in asset 
substitutions and have stronger incentive to divert assets because 
the expected profits from diverting liquid assets can be higher than 
ones from diverting illiquid assets (Burkart and Ellingsen 2004). 
We also control for the dummy variables of having credit rating 
and investment grade bond rating. Faulkender and Petersen (2006) 
show that the availability of debt financing can be constrained by 
the accessibility to bond markets. In a similar vein, investment 
grade bond rating can also reduce the financial constraints faced by 
borrowers. The data is collected at the end of the fiscal year prior to 
loan initiation.
In order to avoid the possibility that unobserved heterogeneity 
drives our findings, we control for various fixed effects. In fact, 
the sample period contains the recent financial crisis. We expect 
that the negative economic shock may help us to find the distinct 
responses of investors to difference level of congruence of interests 
between CEOs and creditors. This occurs because the potential costs 
of divergence of CEO-creditor incentives can be more detrimental to 
creditors during financial crisis. Despite the advantage of detecting 
the contractual differences, it may also be subject to unexpected 
influences of financial crisis. To avoid such effects, we control for 
year fixed effects.
We include two dummy variables for loan types: TermLoan and 
Revolver: approximately 25% of loans are term loans, while about 
65% loans are revolving credit lines. We also include three dummy 
variables for loan purposes: Working Capital, Corporate Purpose, 
and Takeover. About 46% of loans are initiated for general corporate 
purpose, 26% for working capital, and 13% for takeovers. Following 
Petersen (2009), we use heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
errors adjusted for clustering at firm levels and/or time levels 
whenever available.4)
Table 1 reports a summary of the descriptive statistics of loan-
  4) We thank Mitchell Petersen for generously sharing his stata procedures which 
adjust standard errors clustering at firm and time levels simultaneously 
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level data merged with CEO inside debt and firm characteristics. 
The borrowing firms have an average book value of assets of $9.68 
billion, which is greater than the typical firm size in COMPUSTAT 
data. This occurs mainly because LPC collects information about 
loans for large firms. 
RESULTS
Determinants of CEO inside debt
Before turning to the impact of inside debt on loan pricing, we 
Table 1. Summary Statistics: CEO inside debt and bank loans
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explore determinants of CEO inside debt. Sundaram and Yermack 
(2007) examine the determinants of inside debt use for the years 
1996 to 2002, but the more recent results are nonexistent. Here we 
extend their analysis by examining their findings using the more 
recent data. 
It is worth noting that understanding the endogenous nature of 
CEO inside debt in the analysis later in this paper. We consider 
two potential instrument variables which affect the use of firm i’s 
CEO inside debt but do not directly affect loan pricing and non-
pricing contract terms: specifically, CEO age and 3-digit SIC 
industry average of CEO inside debt. For this purpose, we merge 
COMPUSTAT with ExecComp.The data includes 5,012 firm-level 
observations. While the average firm size is smaller than loan-level 
data, firm-level data is very similar to the loan-level data in other 
characteristics.
Figure 2 demonstrates the mean inside debt ratios for different 
CEO ages. As the figure shows, in the sample between ages 45 to 
49, inside debt is 8% of debt and equity linked wealth proxied by the 
sum of total balance of options and shareholdings plus inside debt. 
It increases monotonically until age 55 to 59 and then starts to 


























30 40 45 50 55 60 65 70
Pensions
Deferred compensations
CEO age (unit: years) or moreor less
Figure 2. CEO Inside Debt Holdings by Age
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total wealth. The pattern of inside debt is consistent with the trend 
reported by Sundaram and Yermack (2007).5) For the same age 
groups, the percent defined benefit pensions increase from 3.85% to 
10.29%, and the percent of deferred compensations increases from 
3.01% to 6.47%
For robustness checks, we control for various firm characteristics. 
The regression specification is the following:
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In the above equation, we include 3-digit SIC industry inside debt 
ratio which is defined as the average inside debt ratio for 3-digit SIC 
industry. The use of debt-like incentives may hinge on technology.6) 
In this case, we expect that inside debt ratio is positively associated 
with industry average inside debt level. To avoid the possibility that 
firm i’s inside debt ratio is included in both sides of the equation 
and drives the association between firm i’s inside debt ratio, we 
exclude the firm i’ inside debt ratio when we calculate the industry 
  5) In constrast to our definition of inside debt ratio, Sundaram and Yermack(2007)’s 
inside debt ratio is defined as the inside to equity-holdings. We find that a sig-
nificant number of CEOs hold no equity holdings. Therefore, Sundaram and 
Yermack(2007 exclude firms with CEO who have no equity holdings.
  6) For instance, during the recent financial crisis, there has been a debate on the 
use of debt-linked compensations in banking industry.
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average of inside debt ratio.
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for firm-level analysis. 
Except for the firm size and Altman’s Z scores, firm characteristics 
are analogous to ones for loan-level sample. 
Table 3 presents the results from estimating fixed-effect OLS 
regressions. The regression specifications control for firm size (log 
of total assets), leverage (total liabilities to total assets), profitability 
Table 3. Determinants of CEO Inside Debt Ratio
The table presents the determinants of CEO’s inside debt ratios. Inside debt 
ratio is defined as “inside debt holding /(inside debt holdings+ shareholdings).” 
t-statistics (in the parentheses) are corrected for heteroscedasticity and 
clustering at firm and year following Petersen (2009). Industry inside debt 
ratio is 3-digit SIC industry average inside debt ratio. *, **, *** indicates the 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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(return on assets), investment opportunities (book to market (asset) 
ratio), Altman’s z score, and asset tangibility (PPE over total assets). 
Interestingly, larger, more levered and creditworthy corporations 
tend to have higher CEO inside debt ratio, while firms with greater 
investment opportunities likely to have lower inside debt. 
The regression results reconfirm that CEO age (proxied by log of 
CEO age) and the use of inside debt have a nonlinear relationship. 
The column (1) of table 3 displays the benchmark result which 
does not include either CEO age or industry average of inside 
debt. Columns (2) and (3) of table 3 report the nonlinear effect 
of CEO age and the positive effect of industry average of inside 
debt respectively, and the forth column reports the results for the 
empirical specification which includes both effects. Regardless of 
specifications of the model, we find that CEO age and industry 
average inside debt ratio are positively and significantly associated 
with firm i’s inside debt ratio. In the later analyses, we use industry 
inside debt ratio and CEO age as instrument variables. 
Inside Debt and Costs of Bank Loans
In this section, we directly investigate the relationship between 
CEO inside debt and loan rate spreads. As abundant theories in 
banking and corporate finance show, information asymmetry is 
at the root of corporate financing. This suggests that unobserved 
heterogeneity may bias estimates of the effects of CEO inside debt 
on loan contract terms. To avoid this possibility, we include various 
fixed effects and also use heteroscedasticity consistent standard 
errors clustered at firm and year levels following Petersen (2009). 
Table 4 provides the results from estimating Tobit regressions 
whose dependent variable is the loan rate spread over LIBOR 
(censored at zero). The first column of table 4 reports the results 
from regressing firm i’s CEO inside debt ratio on loan spread. It 
shows that loan spread is negatively associated with CEO inside 
debt ratio and the relationship is statistically and economically 
significant at 0.01 level, supporting the notion that the use of inside 
debt attenuates the agency problem between management and 
creditors. 
CEO inside debt, however, may suffer from endogeneity problems. 
To check the robustness of the results, we re-estimate equation 
1 by using two instrument variables which vary with the use of 
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Table 4. CEO’s Inside Debt Holdings and Loan Rate Spreads: Tobit 
Regression Results
The table presents the results from estimating Tobit regressions. The 
dependent variable is bank loan spread over LIBOR censored at 0. t-statistics 
(in the parentheses) are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering at firm 
and year following Petersen (2009). Industry inside debt ratio is 3-digit SIC 
industry average inside debt ratio. *, **, *** indicates the statistical significance 
at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)




















































































t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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CEO inside debt but does not affect loan rate directly. As we see 
in table 3, the industry average of inside debt ratio is shown to be 
associated with firm i’s use of inside debt. However, it is unlikely to 
be influenced by loan rate spreads for firm i. The columns (2) and (3) 
of table 4 display the estimates from Tobit regressions with CEO’s 
age and the industry average CEO inside debt as instrumental 
variables of inside debt. We find that those instruments variables 
are negatively associated with loan rate spread, and the effects are 
significant at 0.01 level.
For the further robustness check, table 5 reports the results from 
estimating Tobit regressions with endogenous inside debt. Instead 
of considering inside debt as exogenous, we model it as a reduced 
form function of explanatory variables in the main equation and two 
instrument variables, CEO’s age and the industry-level inside debt. 
We use LIML estimators and test erogeneity of inside debt. Monte 
Carlo simulations by Stock et al. (2002) and Poi (2006) show that 
limited maximum likelihood estimators (LIML) are less likely to 
yield bias than GMM and 2SLS estimators. Column (1) of table 5 
shows the estimation results using the total sample of 1,230 deals. 
The Wald statistics rejects the null hypothesis that inside debt is 
exogenous. We find that the qualitative results remain robust. 
We also examine whether the finding is more pronounced for 
information-intensive loans. Berger and Udell (1995) argue that lines 
of credit depend more on borrower-specific, proprietary information. 
Column (2) of table 5 displays the result for the subsample of 
revolving lines of credit. About 65% of the loans in the sample are 
revolving lines of credit. Using the subsample, we reconfirm the 
negative impact of inside debt on loan rate spread. For the other 
remaining loans, we also find the estimates similar to the ones 
from estimating other specifications although they are statistically 
insignificant.
Anti-takeover Defenses and Loan Pricing
In this section, we examine the interactive effects of anti-
takeover defenses and CEO’s inside debt on loan pricing. As we 
discuss in the section 2, the role of inside debt may hinge on the 
level of shareholder-friendly governance. In particular, we explore 
whether inside debt can align the interests between managers and 
creditors in the absence or presence of strong (shareholder-friendly) 
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Table 5. Robustness: IV Tobit Regressions
The table presents the results from estimating Tobit regressions with 
endogenous inside debt ratio. The dependent variable is bank loan spread 
over LIBOR censored at 0. t-statistics (in the parentheses) are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and clustering at firm and year following Petersen 2009. 
Industry inside debt ratio is 3-digit SIC industry average inside debt ratio. *, 
**, *** indicates the statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
All Lines of credit Other loans
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* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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governance. 
Table 6 represents the results of estimating fixed-effect Tobit 
regressions using two subsamples; low (G-index less than and 
equal to 9) and high (G-index higher than 9) levels of anti-takeover 
defenses. We test the equality of the coefficients on instrumented 
inside debt variables from the two subsamples. To be consistent 
with the approaches used in the previous analyses, we attempt 
to estimate Tobit regressions with endogenous inside debt using 
LIML, but the empirical results fail to converge. As an alternative 
approach, we estimated Tobit regressions with the fitted inside debt 
ratio and the industry inside debt separately.
The first and the second columns of table 6 present the results 
from estimating Tobit regressions with fitted inside debt ratios 
reported in Table 3. We find significant evidence that higher inside 
debt lowers loan spreads for firms with high G-index while there is 
no such effect for firms with low G-index. In the third and the fourth 
columns, we check the robustness of the findings using the 3-digit 
SIC industry inside debt ratio. The results remain qualitatively 
unchanged.
We also formally test the equality of the coefficients on 
instrumented inside debt ratios between strong and weak 
shareholder control subsamples. In both specifications, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the 
coefficients ( p-values are 0.106 and 0.165, respectively).
Inside debt and Non-pricing Contract Terms of Bank Loans
In table 7, we examine the effects of CEO’s inside debt holdings 
on the use of collateral by estimating the equation (2). The first 
column of table 7 presents the probit regression estimates. 
The second column presents the results from estimating probit 
regression with endogenous CEO inside debt holdings. Here, we 
also use the industry average CEO inside debt ratio and CEO age as 
instrumental variables. Without considering endogeneity of inside 
debt, we cannot find significant evidence for the effect of inside debt 
holdings. Interestingly, however, when we consider the endogeneity, 
inside debt holding significantly lowers the probability of requiring 
collateral. We test the endogeneity of inside debt and reject the null 
hypothesis of no endogeneity at 0.05 level.
As we discussed in section 2, the joint tests of the effects of 
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Table 6. Anti-Takeover Defenses and Inside Debt
The table presents the results from estimating Tobit regressions with 
endogenous inside debt ratio. The dependent variable is bank loan spread 
over LIBOR censored at 0. G-index is the number of anti-takeover defenses 
constructed by Gompers et al. 2003. t-statistics (in the parentheses) are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering at an individual firm level. 
Industry inside debt ratio is 3-digit SIC industry average inside debt ratio. *, 
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inside debt on loan contract terms are crucial in understanding the 
role of inside debt. We find that higher inside debt narrows loan 
spreads and also reduce the demands for collateral. In sum, the 
findings here appear to support the interest convergence hypothesis 
(hypothesis 1) and costly contracting hypothesis.7) In the third 
and the fourth columns of table 7, we also examine the interactive 
effects of inside debt holdings and shareholder-friendly governance. 
The third column presents the result from estimating IV probit 
regression using loans to firms with shareholder-friendly governance 
(weak anti-takeover defenses; G-index less then and equal to 9), 
and the fourth column presents the regression result using loans to 
firms with less shareholder-friendly governance (strong anti-takeover 
defenses; G-index greater than 9). We find that the coefficient on 
inside debt for firms with weak governance is about ten times 
greater than the one for firms with strong governance. Even after 
considering endogeneity of inside debt, the impact of CEO’s inside 
debt holdings on collateral requirement is far more significant for 
firms with less shareholder-friendly governance.
Table 8 presents the results from estimating negative binomial 
regressions whose dependent variables are the number of different 
types of loan covenants. Although the coefficients on inside debt 
are negative in the most specifications, we cannot find any evidence 
statistically significant at 0.10 level. 
In summary, this paper shows that the use of CEO’s inside debt 
  7) We, however, cannot test whether our findings are more consistent with one of 
these hypothesesCostly contracting hypothesis assumes that loan covenants are 
more cost efficient than other mechanisms, but it is prohibitively difficult the 














Observations 492 431 492 431
Low G-index High G-index




t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7. CEO Inside Debt and Collateral
The table presents the results from estimating probit regressions with/without 
endogenous inside debt ratio (Probit/IV probit). The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable which equals one if collateral is used to secure bank loan, and 
zero otherwise. G-index is the number of anti-takeover defenses constructed 
by Gompers et al. 2003. t-statistics (in the parentheses) are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and clustering at an individual firm level. Industry inside 
debt ratio is 3-digit SIC industry average inside debt ratio. *, **, *** indicates 
the statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.






CEO inside debt ratio -0.238
(-0.76)
















































































































t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
CEO Inside Debt and Costs of Bank Debt Financing 145
Table 8. CEO’s Inside Debt Holdings and Covenant Intensity
The table presents the results from estimating Poisson regressions without 
endogenous inside debt ratio. The dependent variable is the number of 
covenants. G-index is the number of anti-takeover defenses constructed 
by Gompers et al. 2003. t-statistics (in the parentheses) are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and clustering at an individual firm level. Industry inside 
debt ratio is 3-digit SIC industry average inside debt ratio. *, **, *** indicates 


































































































































































t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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reduces costs of bank loans and demands for collateral, while 
there is no significant evidence for the effect of inside debt on loan 
covenants. For firms with weak shareholder rights, managerial 
incentives induced by holding inside debt appears to be statistically 
and economically significant, while we do not find such evidence 
for the firms with strong shareholder rights. Overall, our findings 
jointly support the notion that debt-based incentives for CEOs 
increase convergence of interests between creditors and managers 
on average. However, it appears that debt-based incentives do 
not complement strong shareholder rights. Instead, when there is 
absence of strong shareholder rights, debt-based incentives play 
important roles in aligning the interests of creditors with managers. 
CONCLUSION
A huge literature on managerial incentives is dedicated to the 
questions about stock-based incentives. Implicit in the literature 
is the assumption that manager-creditor interests can be easily 
aligned. Recent studies, however, illustrate that managerial 
incentives can be more intricate than the assumption; each firm 
may have a different level of manager-creditor congruence depending 
on the amount of lifelong pensions and deferred compensations to 
managers. In particular, managers with debt-like incentives, such 
pensions and deferred compensations, may benefit from reducing 
risk exposures and pursuing conservative financial policies, 
potentially at the costs of shareholders (Sundaram and Yermack 
2007, Wei and Yermack 2011).
This paper presents novel evidence on the relationship between 
CEO’s inside debt holdings, measured as the sum of defined benefit 
pensions and deferred compensations, and private debt contract 
structure. Higher inside debt compensation decreases loan spread 
over LIBOR and reduce demands for collateral, while there is no 
significant evidence of the impact on debt covenant intensity. 
Overall, the findings support the creditor-manager congruence view 
that managers with pensions and deferred compensations are likely 
to have less incentive to take risk, thus aligning their incentives with 
creditors. 
We also attempt to bridge the gap in extant studies in corporate 
finance by exploring the interactive effects of internal and external 
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governance, particularly interactions between inside debt and anti-
takeover defenses. A vast research in corporate finance investigates 
managerial incentives and shareholder-creditor agency conflicts 
separately, but their interactions are not thoroughly explored. 
Managerial incentive literature simplifies away agency issues 
between managers and creditors, mainly focusing on manager-
shareholder convergence of interests. We provide evidence that the 
effects of inside debt on private debt contracts are more pronounced 
when there is lack of strong external governance accompanied 
by hostile takeovers, suggesting that lack of shareholder-friendly 
governance does not necessarily lead to creditor-friendly governance. 
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